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I do not belong to the school of pessimists who consider that im-
poverished and underdeveloped countries such as Indonesia are necess-
arily hampered by an absolute shortage of domestic, fiscal and finan-
cial resources for development, Nor do I believe that large scale
capital inflows in the form of foreign investment or foreign aid
must provide the bulk of financial resources to support a domestic
development programo Compared to many underdeveloped countries,
Indonesia has extensive natural resources and unutilised factors of
production which could be combined to increase output if mobilisation
of financial resources to provide the complementary capital could be
accomplished. It is indeed true that the present rate of capital
formation in Indonesia is relatively low, although not nearly so low
as we have been led to believe. The thesis which I wish to develop is
that latent financial resources do exist, and given proper institutional
evolution and an aggressive program of action, these domestic resources
could be mobilized to contribute to a fruitful development plan.
Repeatedly economists have been frustrated by their wrong prog
nostications for the potentiality of economic development. Fre-
quently these prognostications are made on the basis of observed
rates of savings and investment. The observed rates seem so low that
substantial increases in investment necessary to maintain per capita
income, much less increasing it, seems to be an impossible objective.
Recent experience in countries where violence has been done to
traditional institutional structures which stood in the way of
mobilizing existent and potential resources demonstrates that the
financial factor in the quantitative sense is not necessarily a major
obstacle to development. I would wish to refer in particular to the
recent experience of China, When the inflow of foreign capital came
to a virtual standstill during the late 1920's, economic observers
found that net disinvestment was taking place in China as a whole,
In other words, the rate of investment was believed to be negative,
It was felt that it would be impossible for China to produce a sub..
stantial rate of positive investment in light of its serious popu-
lation pressure on resources.
*This is a revised draft of a paper original3y presented at ajoint Indonesian Embassy-Center for International Studies meeting on
December 21, 1954o
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2Under the Communist regime, however, the observed negative rate
of investment has been reversed and significant levels of net invest-
ment-.perhaps as high as 10 to 12 percent of net national incomel--
have been achieved. This is not meant to suggest that authoritarian
methods are condoned or should be employed to mobilize potentially
existent financial resources. However, it is intended to suggest that
given changes in institutional, political and social structure,
developmental investment in underdeveloped economies (even those with
the adverse population-resourceu ratio which exists in China) can be
significantly increased. The problem therefore does not seem to lie
in the absolute deficiency of financial resources. Rather, it
appears to lie in the institutional, social and political obstacles
to mobilizing these resources for diversion to a concerted develop-
ment effort. If this hypothesis is correct, it nmeans that major
attention should be given to the locus of hidden financial resources
and the means of overcoming current obstacles which tend to prevent
available resources being converted into positive investment necessary
for economic growth.
It is believed that these erroneous prognostications have been
made on the basis of two common errors of observation. In the first
place, it appears that underdeveloped economies ordinarily perform a
higher level of anua savings and investment than that usually
ascribed to them. Although such investment may not flow into channels
leading to growth prior to the beginning of a development program, it
nevertheless represents the existence of resources which could con-
ceivably be diverted to developmental investment without great
reductions in the level of current consumption.
Secondly, I believe that observers tend to exaggerate at least
the quantitative problem involved in increasing the rate of not
investment. On the basis of vV research in Indonesia, it appears
that strategic changes in the tax system could reduce the ar e
level of consumption to provide new resources for investme oat f
1. This estimate varies somewhat with the amount of depreciation
assumed. It is believed that the figures given here approximate the
rough order of magnitude of investment realised in 195W. They are
indeed more favorable than the estimate of gross investment for 1952
presented in W. W. Rostow and Others, The Prospects for Comenmist China
p. 279, (12 percent of Gross National r ) Theigher estimates
presented here are hypothesized on the basis of (1) decreased military
strain on the econonr following the end of Korean military action, and
(2) the extension and increased effectiveness of state devices to
extract and invest savings from the econong.
More exact estimates of the size of Chinese doestic investment
will eventually emerge from a study now being undertaken at the Center
for International Studies. This study will attempt to compare Coaxwist
Chinats recent economic progress with that of India.
3current economic product. There appear to be margins of taxable capacity
in particular sectors of the econoier which could be reached to provide
real savings from the present patterns of output and consumption. 2
Moreover, it is clear that both idle and underemployed resources exist
within the present economic framework. Although the effective combina-
tion of these factors appears to be a formidable problem, their existence
should be recognised as an eventual resource pool for accelerating the
rate of investment as a development program gets under way.
The main thesis that I vould like to develop is that substantial
financial resources are presently and potentially available for an
Indonesian development program. If these are matched against present
estimates of capital- requirements necessary to produce a significant
level of growth of per capita consuption, it appears that Indonesia
can make substantial economic progress or the basis of resources now
available but not now mobilised for concrete objectives. However, a
steady flow of foreign investment and/or foreign aid is required to
complement domestic financial efforts to alleviate the foreign exchange
problems inherent in a development program.
Unfortunately there is little analysis available which would lead
us to reliable estimates of the amounts of capital required to achieve
given economic objectives. Dr. Eugene Grasberg has done pioneering
research in this area in his recent paper on Indonesia's investment
requirements 0 3 Dr. Grasberg has utilised the data made available by
Dr. Neumark' s national income study to estimate the order of magni-
tude of annual investment required to meet conservative economic
objectives. These objectives include elimination of the 1952 Balance
of Payments deficit (4. 85 billion rupiah), maintenance of per capita
consumption at 1952 levels and redaction of food imports by 50
percent. If the realization of these objectives were spread over a
ten year period, Grasberg estimates that annual investment of approxi.
mately Rp. 10 billion would be required. These requirements,
however, appear to be relatively high since they are based on a
Balanc of Payments deficit greatly exceeding the 1953 deficit (2.75 billion
rupiah) and the anticipated 1,954 deficit'. Moreover, they are
2. This point will be developed below0 See also ny article, "The
Tax Burden and Economic Development in Indonesia", Ekonomi Dan Kngan
Indonesias September, 1954,.
3. Eugene Graeberg, "Indonesia' s Investment Requirements", Center
for International Studies, Document Control #C/54-9.
4. This figure is comparable to Dr. Grasberg's estimate of the
Balance of Payments deficit for 1952 since it is calculated on the same
basis. Thus it includes items 1 through 8A in the standard Indonesian
Balance of Payments (i.e,., all items in Current Account except donations)
u the total of export duties, Grasberg' s 1952 figure is taken from
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based on Neumark's estimate of net investment in 1952 (Rp, 600 million)
which is, in riy opinion, far too low to be employed in realistic
estimates.
In more recent research, Dr. Grasberg has estimated that a lump
sum investment in any one given year of 30 billion rupiah would be
required to achieve the above objectives in addition to providing a
2 percent increase in annual per capita consumption. It is agreed,
however, that the investment required to meet these objectives need
not take place in any given year* If proper thought were given to
devising an investment program spread over a number of years, it is
believed that annual investment of approximately 12 to 15 billion
rupiah could provide per capita ao ns10ption increases of approxi.-
mately one to two percent per annum.w
I would now like to turn to the question of mobilizing the financial
resources for a development program of roughly this order of magni-
tude. 1Y7 research has led me to believe that a substantial amount of
the financial resources to meet these capital requirements could be
found domestically. But it is also mgy belief that these resources
should be mobilized through the tax system and hence should represent
abstinence from current consumption rather than net additions to the
income stream in the form of newly created money, To establish these
propositions, let us consider briefly the three potential areas
through which financial resources for development could conceivably
be mobilized.
First of all, we might consider the balance of payments as a
device to provide capital for Indonesian economic development, The
item 17, Net Borrowing From Abroad from Table III of Neumark's National
Income Study (The National Income of Indonesia, Ekonomi dan K an
Indonesia, June, 1954). Neumark defines this item as eu to items
13to0~ af- the Balance of Payments less export taxes". What Neumark
actually means is that the value of export duties should be substracted
from the value of merchandise exports, or alternatively (as we have
done) added to the deficit on current account.
For my estimate of the 1953 deficit, the Balance of Payments figure
is taken from the 1953-1954 Bank Indonesia ort pp. 80-81, and the
value of export duties is ta fen"Fm=the Nao Planning Bureau' a,
"Indonesia's Economic Developments in 1953", Ekonomi dan Keuangan
Indonesia. July, 1954, Table 48, p. 450.
5. These estimates will soon be more carefully calculated and
presented by Dr. Grasbergo
Balance of Payments could provide an effective channel if it would be
possible to provide a surplus in the current account to finance the
import of capital into Indonesia. This would of course necessitate
the use of further devices to insure that the capital thus developed
could be channeled into the kind of investment which the Indonesian
development program would call for. However, analysis of Indonesia's
recent Balance of Payments indicates that prospects for mobilizing
financial resources through this medium are not very bright, at least
in the immediate future. An important characteristic of post-independence
Balance of Payments has been the high level of liabilities in the
invisible account* These items comprise relatively fixed obligations
which cannot be reduced in any given year or even during a period of
years in the near future. The main items have been transfers repre-
senting income on investment and costs of foreign technicians (including
pensions for previous civil servants) of which a substantial part has
been set in treaty agreements with Holland. A survey of the 1953
Balance of Payments will emphasize the nature of the problem. In 1953
the reported value of commodity exports amounted to approximately
Rp. 7.7 billion. Imports of goods amounted to about Rp. 7.2 billion,
thus providing a slim margin of one-half billion rupiah on 6ommbdity
account. If proceeds from export duties are deducted from the value of
commodity exports, however, commodity account would show a deficit of
one-half billion rupiah. On the other hand, the deficit. on the in..
visibles account amounted to Rp. 2 billion, and the debit balance of
long-term capital items approximated one-fourth billion rupiah. Thus
the total Balance of Payments deficit was equal to approximately two
and three-fourths billion rupiah. Hence, if capital were to be
mobilized through the Balance of Payments, a commodity export surplus
would have to be produced to overcome what appears to be a relatively
permanent deficit in the invisibles account, The other alternative,
of course, would be further reductions in the level of imports; here
again, prospects appear to be rather dubious, Indonesia has already
followed a strictly enforced policy of import controls, reducing
imports to what I believe is a minimum level consistent with the present
level of production in the econory. It appears that in 1954 imports
will consist mainly of food and other necessities, raw materials to
maintain Indonesian production and capital goods to provide mainterance
of Indonesia's productive resources intact.
However, in the longer run there may be some hope of achieving a
level of exports adequate to induce some inflow of capital. During the
last three months of this year, prices of rubber and other agri-
cultural exports have been rising and it is probable that export
earnings will-exceed the 1953 level by Rp. o800 million, Since
imports have been cut even below the 1953 level the effective 1954
Balance of Payments deficit will be rather small. These results have
been achieved by a rather broad export promotional policy which has
significantly increased the volume of exports over the 1951 and 1952
levels. In the longer run there is no question but that a development
6program will add to Indonesia's capacity to earn through exporting.
However, it should be emphasized that significantly increased export
earnings will depend on technological improvements providing for,
among other things, industrial processing of agricultural raw
materials. Such improvements can only be obtained by increased in-
vestment in this particular sector. The results of this investment
will appear after a rather lengthy gestation period and will be
hampered by rather high capital-output ratios. Thus in the short
run, financing of Indonesian economic growth of the required magni-
tude will have to come from other sources.
In the second place, we might consider the possibility of
financing Indonesian development through public or private mobilization
of vol tary savings, a channel which has been effectively used else-
where. In this particular case, I would like to emphasize some
rather special problems which Jeopardise not only this kind of
financing of Indonesian development but the financing of economic
growth in Indonesia generally. The problem to which I refer.is the
fact that in recent years the Indonesian econor has witnessed a
growth of large, inactive balances, withdrawn from previous income
streams for precautionary or speculative motives. At the present,
these balances amount to rather volatile hoards (held primarily as
cash) which could be released in the face of inflationary tendencies
and which would be apt to frustrate the development program. It is
generally agreed by observers of the Indonesian economy that sub-
stantial parts of the new additions to Indonesia's income stream
(resulting from budgetary deficits) end up as these monetary hoards.
Thus any effort to mobilize this type of savings from past income for
development purposes would be tantamount to creation of new money,
since the velocity of money now in circulation would be increased.
If this type of financing were employed on a large scale it would
inevitably induce substantial pressures on the level of prices and the
Balance of Payments. As prices began to rise there would be great
danger of releasing the presently inactive balances as demand for
commodities. If price rises became a reality and further rises were
expected, there is no question but that a good part of these balances
would be converted into commodities which in periods of rising prices
are a more favorable means of holding on to one's economic resources.
Before inflationary financing of ary type is employed in Indonesia, it
is extremely important that the precise relationship between addition of
new money to the income stream and these monetary hoards be examined
rather closely. It has been suggested, for example, that even the
6. For elaboration on this method of financing economic develop-
ment see my paper, "Finaicing Economic Development in Indonesia:
Public and Private Mobilization of Voluntary Savings", Center for
International Studies, Document Control #G/55-2.
7limited amount of deficit financing which the Indonesian government
has undertaken recently may have very close correlation to the growth
of these inactive but highly liquid balances. Thus the precise rela-
tionship between deficit financing, idle balances, and the pressures
on price levels and the balance of payments should be investigated.
On the other hand, it might be well to experiment with this type of
financing on a limited scale in order to engender the habit of con-
verting savings into investment through banking or public channels.
The Ministry of Finance is now considering the issue of a new flotation
of government bols (about 300 million rupiah) with new features
designed to attract idle funds. If this issue is successful, this
device might be employed to mop up these highly liquid but inactive
balances under a policy aimed specifically at neutralization of these
hoards, rather than financing of development
The launching of a development program in the conditions of this
monetary overhing implies that inflationary financing must be restricted
if economic stability is to be maintained. Hence, it is. argued that
during the first years of development financing should come mainly from
reductions in current consumption. It should be recognised, however,
that even- this type of provision for developmental investment may have
inflationary aspects. This is true since the monetary stream itself
will not be contracting, while the flow of fbods for consumption purposes
will be reduced as a greater share of current resources are devoted
to production of investment goods. On the other hand, it is generally
recognized that the output increases that will eventually emerge from
developental investment will not appear immediately. The gestation
period ill vary from project to project, but in any case there will
be considerable delay in output responses to investment. An in-
flationary gap will exist until the supply of consumption goods
reasies (and exceeds) its original level, The inflationary consequences
coriid be reduced by successively taxing away this gap in each economic
prriod. It is also possible that the gap might disappear through
reduction in the propensity to consume among the higher income groups
V! the imported (primarily luxuries and semi-luxuries) goods upon
which these groups were accustomed to spend a part of their incomes
bacame totally unavailable. As output increases result from the
levelopment program, the decision concerning allocation of these
results between resources for an increased rate of investment and
provision for increased consumption will have to be made.
From our review of the potentialities of financing development
from the Balance of Payments or by mobilization of voluntary savings,
it appears that any substantial increases in investment without infla-
tionary consequences will require major reliance on the central and
local fiscal processes. The level of net investment now being per-
formed by the econoMy through both public and private channels
provides a useful starting point for a development program thus financed.
The existence of these investment resources L sr however, does not
8imply that their present employment will lead to realization of the
economic objectives for which capital requirements are estimated.
Hence, some redirection of investment now carried out by public
means may be required to eventually meet the objectives of raising
per capita consumption.
Before turning to the search for new investment resources, we
present a rough estimate of the present level of net investment
accomplished by the economr as a whole, On the basis of the present
observer's experience, the Neumark estimate of investment performed
by the Indonesian econor in 1952 should be discarded as unrealistically
low, Although Neumark found gross investment approximating 4 1/2 billion
rupiah in this particular year, he estimated net investment at only
600 million rupiah. This is far below the level which appears to
emerge flrom a study based on the year 1953. On the basis of materials
that could be assembled for 1953, it was estimated that the level of
gross investment was approximately 10 percent of Indonesian gross
national product. Employing the usual depreciation rates br the
economy as a whole and correcting for somewhat lower depreciation of
governmental facilities, it appears that the level of net investment
in 1953 was approximately Rp. 4.7 billion. However, even this estimate
does not take account of what I observed to be a substantial amount
of investment carried out at the local levels of government and not
subsidized by the central governmientO7 Ir estimate for this component
of net investment was placed at one billion rupiah for 1953. With this
correction we arrive at a total level of net investment in 1953
amounting to Rp. 5.7 billion. To this estimate of net investment we
can now add our. further estimates of resources which could be
mobilized through the tax system and employed for investment purposes
by the central and local governments.
My earlier study of the tax burden in Indonesia8 and empirical
investigation in Indonesia suggest that there are areas of taxable
capacity which could be exploited without harmful effects on either
economic incentives or levels of consumption in the lower income groups.
On the basis of what material is available on Indonesian national
income and from ar analysis of the Indonesian tax structure, I have
concluded that income has been rising in the rural sector of the
econovr relative to the urban sector.9  On the other hand, it was
7. The estimate above includes only local, investment directly
subsidized by the Ministry of Interior.
8. Douglas S. Paauw, 2. Lit.
9, Ibid.
9clear that in recent years the burden of taxation has significantly
shifted from the rural sector to the urban sector, thus Indicating
that financial resources for taxation lie primarily in the rural sector,
It also appears that the burden on most economic functions in the
urban sector is now near the maximum consistent with economic incen-
tives. Further observation of the rural sector of the economy and
discussions with local officials in many areas of Indonesia indicated
that there were margins in this sector which could be reached by new
tax levies. However, it is also clear that these margins of taxable
capacity are found primarily among upper income groups (traders and
landlords), although it is also true that in some geographic areas
there have been relatively general inrwses in income not reached by
new tax levies. Thus I am suggesting that these increases and shifts
in income be reached by new tax devices or stricter enforcement of
present taxation. Some of these could be reached through central
taxation while others could be reached most efficiently through taxes
enforced through local levels of government.
Representatives of the central fiscal offices in localities in
most areas of Indonesia estimated that stricter enforcement and more
adequate administration of two important revenue producers-the comparg
tax and the income tax--could double -the yield of these levies, at
current rates. Approximately Rp. 1.7 billion in new revenues could
thus be added to central government tax collections, if 1953 results
are taken as typical of present yields. If the level of current central
government expenditures could be reduced and held to the line indicated
below, these expanded central tax collections could be devoted to
financing the development program. Central fiscal offices emphasised,
however, that revenues from these major taxes could be increased only
if the tax structure as a whole were simplified. Abandonment of taxes
unimportant as revenue producers but complex in terms of administration
is an essential aspect of maximizing the proceeds from potentially
lucrative sources of revenue.10 The new yields from these taxes would
come primarily from the upper income groups in the rural sector, now
escaping the central tax administration. There would be problems of
enforcing the new tax bites as actual reductions in consumption among
these groups since these are the classes which characteristically hold
inactive but highly liquid cash balances. Hence it would be possible
for these groups, at least in part, to replace tax withdrawals from
current income by activating balances residual from past incomes unless
governmental policy intervened,
I would now like to turn to the search for new fiscal resources
at the local levels of government 0 On the basis of ny personal
observations of fiscal processes at this level, I have estimated that
10, Douglas S. Paauw, "The Role of Local Finance in Indonesian
Economic Development", Center for International Studies, Document Control
0/54-25j, pp. 9-12.
10
the amount of net investment now being performed by all levels of
local government would approximate one and one quarter billion rupiah.11
From local officials generally I gathered the impression that if proper
allocation of tax bases were worked out between the central government
and local government this amount of local investment could be approxi-
mately doubled. However, it should be emphasized that this amount of
new local investment could be expected only if the Nasrun recommenda-
tions for inter-governmental division of fiscal function is successful
in tying local benefit to local sacrifice through taxation. Fiscal
officials in all areas which I visited indicated that collection of
local type taxes such as the rural income tax through the central
fiscal system tends to minimise the proceeds of such taxation because
the link between local sacrifice and local benefit becomes blurred.
It is mgy recommendation that revenue bases which lie close to the
levels of local administration should be allocated to the localities to
provide revenues for their developmental and current expenditures.
In particular, it was generally suggested by local officials that
assigning the rural income to the localities would provide much greater
yields from this revenue source than are now being collected for central
government account. On the basis of my discussions, it seems realistic
to assume that the transfer of this and similar revenue bases to
localities would provide local resources to meet the greater part of
current expenditures as well as the higher level of local investment
called for here. In 1953 subsidies to localities amounted to Rp. 1.9
billion. Increased local fiscal autonomy could probably reduce the
level of government subsidy to less than Rp. 1 billion, allowing for
regional differences in the ability to increase local revenues from
the tax bases which should ideally be transferred to localities.
In short, we conclude that if local benefit is clearly linked
with local sacrifice in the form of taxation, extension of taxation at
this level and increased popular cooperation would significantly in-
crease total resources for development. Thus if this principle were
carried out by an abitious reorganisation of the entire tax structure,
we could add another 1 1/4 billion rupiah to total tax resources for
development as well as planning reduced central expenditures for
subsidy of approximately Rp. 1 billion.
Finally, the search for new investment resources may be extended
to the government budget itself, specifically on the expenditure side.
Recent students of the Indonesian budget have suggested that strenuous
economy efforts in the items of current expenditure might eventuate in
reductions of Rp. 2 billion, while the efficiency of administration
could be maintained. In addition, we have estimated that government
subsidies to provinces could be reduced by Rp. 1 billion if localities
were allowed to exploit revenue bases within their purview0 Hence, the
ll Iid., p. 15.
1level of current government expenditures might be cut by Rp. 3 billion
below the 1953 amounts, upon which these studies are based. However,
even at this level of expenditures, the central government was operating
at a deficit of approximately Rp. 2 billion. Hence, some thought should
be given to whether the funds made available from reductions in current
governmental expenditures should be employed to eliminate the deficit
or to provide a limited inflationary ingredient to total financing of
the development program. It it is believed that the 1953 level of
deficit financing (Rp, 2 billion) could be continued without more
serious pressures on prices or the Balance of Payments than were felt
in 1953, inflationary financing of this amount might be retained. It
appears that the monetary effect of this scale of deficit financing was
offset by the increase of inactive balances. If it is demonstrated that
these balances are in danger of jeopardising either economic stability
or the development program, the inflationary ingredient of development
financing would best be eliminated, and consideration might be given
to the merits of employing some of the savings from reduced current
expenditures to neutralize the monetary impact of inactive hoards.
We are now in a position to put together a total estimate of
investment resources now available to the econon7 plus those which may
be mobilized by a more effective fiscal process. This estimate may
then be compared with our estimates of capital required to produce
specified rates of economic growth, The results of our analysis are
presented in Table I.
TABLE I
Total Investment Resources (Domestic)
(In billions of rupiah)
Estimated Actual Investment: (1953)
Gross: 9,0
Depreciation: 4,3
Net Investment j7
Correction (Local Investment) 1.0
Total Net Investment
Additional Government Investment Resources:
Increased Central Taxation 1,7
Increased Local Investment 1.25
Reduced Current Expenditures 3.0
12
We have estimated that the current level of net investment now
being accomplished by the econorVy is approximatelY Rp. 5.7 billion.
To this we have added Rp. 1.7 billion from increased central tax
revenues and Rp. L25 billion as new investment resources made avail-
able at the local levels of government. Finally, we have added
Rp. 3 billion which would result from reducing the present level of
current expenditure undertaken by the central government. This would
give us a maximum level of present and potential investment resources
totalling Rp. 11.65 billion Whether or not the total of the new
governmental resources (Rp. 5.5 billion) should be devoted to in-
vestment depends on assessment of the inflationary tendencies in the
econorgy as the development program gets underway.
The total of these resources obviously comes very close to our
estimates of the capital required to achieve eventual annual growth
rates of 1 to 2 percent in per capita consumption. On the basis of
these estimates, an inflow of foreign capital of approximately Rp. 1
to 5 billion12 (about $90 million to 0450 million) would be required
to achieve the specified growth objectives. The public or foreign
component of developmental investment required to meet specified
growth rates might be reduced by the expansion of domestic private
investment. It is reasonable to expect that private investment would
increase in the atmosphere of expansion created by the government
development program. New profit opportunities should arise as external
economies, industrial raw materials and an increasngly skilled labor
force emerge. It would be hoped that the expansion of private invest-
ment could be financed by mobilization of voluntary savings from current
income through private banking channels; in fact, government policy
should be aimed at developing the Indonesian banking system to assume
this role in the financing of Indonesian economic development. 1 3
Although the role assigned to foreign capital in the suggested
pattern of developmental financing is not dominant, it is indeed
critical. We have pointed out that the level of capital imports
cannot be greatly expanded in the short run on the basis of Indonesia's
own resources. Thus it is clear that an increased flow of capital
goods to meet the needs of the development program would have to be
financed largely by external resources.
12. Depending on the exact size of estimated capital requirements,
the growth in per capita consuption aimed at, and whether or not all
the investment resources described here are devoted to investment.
13. This point is expanded in ry paper, "Financing Economic
Development in Indonesia: Public and Private Mobilization of Voluntary
Savings", Center for International Studies, Document Control #C/55-2.
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The foreign trade ingredient of the Indonesian development pro-
gram may be roughly estimated on the basis of experience elsewhere.
Conservative estimates place the ratio of imported capital goods to
total (gross) domestic investment at 20 to 25 percent, depending on
the sectoral allocation of investment resources, If requirements for
raw material imports are added to this figure, this ratio would rise to
25 to 35 percent of the total outlay for investment.14 These require-
ments are higher in the early years of a development program when pro-
vision for depreciation is largely on the basis of old investment.
As the depreciation rate falls with the increasing importance of new
investment relative to total capital stock, the foreign capital
requirement in the development program will fall p passu.
In 1953S the year employed as the basis of the present estimates,
imports of capital goods (exclusive of the oil companies) totaled
Rp. .o44 billion (16 percent of estimated gross domestic investment).
Imports of raw materials and capital goods totaled about Rp. h billion
(44 percent of estimated gross domestic investment). However,
Indonesia is heavily dependent on import of raw materials for its
limited industrial output; hence, it is doubtful whether capital good
imports could be substituted for raw materials in the short run, if the
1953 level of domestic industrial output were maintained.
If the required foreign capital component is assumed to be 22.5percent of total gross investment, capital imports would have to be
expanded to Rp. 3.38 billion to meet the requirements of the program
outlined here. On the basis of 1953 figures, foreign aid and invest-
ment would have to be increased by Rp. 1.94 billion (U. S. $170 million)
annually to meet this requirement if all the investment resources
(providing for gross investment of about Rp. 15 billion) outlined here
were employed. This would require that new foreign financing provide
about 15 percent of the total net capital requirements suggested above
(Rp. 1.94 billion out of Rp. 12.6 billion). Statistics recording
Indonesia's capital imports in 1954 are not yet available, but it
appears that there will be no significant change in their value.
It is problematical whether foreign capital in the form of new
foreign investment and foreign aid of this magnitude (Rp. 1.94 billion)
would be forthcoming in present political and economic realities in
Indonesia, although this figure is not outside the range of possibility.
It is gratifying that new tendencies to extend substantially greater
foreign aid to Indonesia are apparent in the United States as well as
in Western Europe. A further problem relates to the limiting nature(from the domestic development point of view) of direct investment
which is largely the form in which investments have been undertaken
in Indonesia in recent years. The capital imports financed by such
14. See for example the estimates made by Rostow and Others, for
Communist China, Mcit., pp. 265-266.
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investment remain outside the purview of developmental planning and
may not be usable in the sectors in which the development plan would
seek to utilize them. However, it should be recognized that direct
investment, whether related to the development plan or not, would
contribute to raising per capita income (and consumption) by employing
labor more productively than in its old pursuits within the confines
of the underdeveloped econon. It follows that a substantially
increased flow of direct investment might contribute to realizing
the capital requirements necessary to reach desired economic objectives.
If direct investments are allocated in accord with geographic location
of resources, it appears that there will be no short-run conflict
with the development plan with regard to competition for the econong's
basic economic resources--land and labor, which are still abundant(in aggregative terms) relative to the econony's demands upon them.
In the past Indonesia has absorbed large capital inflows, exported
primarily from Holland. If the years of the Great Depression (1931-1939),
which had a deleterious economic effect upon both Holland and Indonesia,
are considered to be untypical, we must go back to the pre-1930 period
for relevant data During the years 1925-1930, foreign investment(reinvested profits of foreign firms, plus new long-term investment)
averaged 3 1/3 percent of net national income. Foreign investment in
the stricter sense (new long-term investment) averaged 1.9 percent of
net national income. '- If new foreign investment of this order of
magnitude relative to Indonesian national income could be provided today,
it would approximate Rp, 1.6 to Rp. 1.7 billion and would go far toward
meeting the foreign capital requirements (estimated to be Rp. 1.9
billion) of a program designed to raise domestic per capita consumption.
The impressively large capital inflows during the colonial period
did not produce significant results in raising per capita standards of
living or diversifying the structure of the Indonesian econong. This
was true for three fairly obvious reasons: (1) the income increases
resulting from thig investment was largely transferred abroad rather
than re-invested,l1 (2) the pattern of investment was limited to
industries with export significance rather than those producing for the
domestic market and (3) the foreign financed investment activity was
not complemented by a larger domestic investment program such as that
called for here. These observations underline the need for domestic
sacrifice to provide the bulk of the resources for a program of economic
development.
We have sought to establish the thesis that a program of develop-
ment leading to eventual increases in per capita consumption could be
15. J. J. Polak, The National Income of the Netherlands Indies
921-22. The ratios nT ew long-term foreigiiTnvestment for in-
dividual years was as follows: 1925, 1.6; 1926, .9; 1927, .7;
1928, 2.0; 1929, 1.2; 1930, 5.3,
16. Ibid., Table 14.1.
financed largeLy from domestic resources. We have argued that these
resources should be mobilized through devices which will limit the
short-rum inflationary consequences of diverting current resources
to production of capital goods. Rough estimates of the order of
magnitude have been assigned to the capital needs of the econors and
the investment resources which might be mobilized by the suggested
devices to meet these needs. These estimates should be regarded as
extremely tentative; detailed studies on both sides of the economic
ledger are suggested before planning be undertaken on the basis of the
preliminary studies to which we now have access.
Finally it might be well to emphasize a few implications of this
program of financing economic development in Indonesia. It is
suggested that the financing come mainly from a reduction in consump-
tion. In fact, this is the only justification for recommending that
strenuous efforts be made to mobilize resources through the fiscal
system As we have intimated above, there is indeed some question as
to whether or not it is realistic to assume that tax financing will be
effective in reducing consumption. To the extent that the tax bite
were applied to upper income groups, it is entirely possible that what
is intended as reduction in consumption expenditures may eventuate
as addition of new money to the income stream. Within these groups,
funds which are originally withdrawn by taxation may be replaced
from the existing monetary hoards from past incomes. Hence the level
of consumption expenditures could very well be maintained among
these groups which possess substantial idle balances, in spite of
higher tax payments. If governmental policy is specifically aimed at
reducing the level of consumption through this financing program, it
may therefore be necessary to attempt some type of rationing to
enforce the reductions in consumption. I realise that serious
administrative problems would accompany the introduction of rationing
in a country such as Indonesia. However, some type of selective
rationing might be feasible. It might be relatively simple, for example,
to restrict consumption of luxuries and semi-luxuries which are largely
consumed by the upper income groups.
A second implication of the pattern of financing outlined here is
that mobilization of investment resources and the administration of
development investment itself would be carried out by local governments
as wel as by the central government. Over 40 percent of the new tax
resources for development would come from the local governments,
according to mr estimates. However, on3,y 30 percent of the total
investment program would be prosecuted at this level of government.
To the extent that local governments participate in the investment
program, a program of decentralization of economi c development in
Indonesia is implied, The question then occurs as to whether or not
local administrative facilities are available to carry out investment
at these levels of government. 1 r own impression is that a reservoir
of competent officials, not fully utilized under the present system
of inter-governmental division of functions, exists at this level. A
more serious economic question is whether or not the resources made
available at the local level could be integrated into a general
development program aimed at increasing production. The problem is
that resources mobilized at this level appear to be highly localized.
However, it is vy opinion that Indonesia's development program will
have to concentrate in part on providing basic local facilities such
as irrigation works, transportation facilities and small-scale, state-
operated productive enterprises, It appears that local investment
resources can most easily be mobilized in the outlying islands where
these facilities are most lacking. In mgy experience, local govern-
ments already assign high priority to productive projects and allocate
resou es on the basis of estimates of the productivity of alternate
uses. 1 Thus it appears that diversion of local financial resources
to projects related to the country's economic growth is not an insur-
mountable problem0
There are also important publicity aspects of the program
recommended here. The program is obviously one of austerity since it
implies generally reduced levels of consumption, particularly among the
upper income groups. Yet, it is emphasized that by tying local
benefit to sacrifice it might become clear to the Indonesian people that
eventual increased output will result from the government program and
that today's sacrifice would be tomorrow' s gain. Thus the local aspect
of financing the program may well be a blessing in disguise. Finally,
this program may well tend to allay some of the existing political
objections to foreign participation in the financing of Indonesian
economic development. Recognition of the fact that domestic financing
of investment entails sacrifice in the way of reduced consumption may
well add to the attractiveness of foreign capital. Again, the fact
that the program outlined here calls for substantial domestic financing
implies that the domestically owned sector will be rapidly expanded.
New productive facilities will be primarily Indonesian owned and the
scope of foreign ownership will be circumscribed by the program itself.
If it is clear that the indigenous role will be the dominant one in
development, fear of foreign domination in the modern sector may be
considerably reduced and foreign capital may be welcomed as a comple-
ment in the total program for Indonesia's economic progress.
17. In fact, in one area I found rather sophisticated use of
capital-output ratios to establish investment criteria.
